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This study investigates whether models of forward looking behavior explain the observed
patterns of heavy drinking and smoking of men in late middle age in the Health and Re-
tirement Study better than myopic models. We develop and estimate a sequence of nested
models which diﬀer by their degree of forward looking behavior. Our empirical ﬁndings
suggest that forward looking models ﬁt the data better than myopic models. These models
also dominate other behavioral models based on out-of-sample predictions using data of
men aged 70 and over. Myopic models predict rates of smoking for old individuals which
are signiﬁcantly larger than those found in the data on elderly men.1 Introduction
Two competing theories have been proposed for explaining the consumption of potentially
harmful and addictive goods. Early approaches typically attributed consumption of these
goods to irrational or myopic behavior (Winston, 1980; Thaler and Sheﬀrin, 1981).1 More
recently, Stigler and Becker (1977) and Becker and Murphy (1988) have forcefully argued
that addiction can be modeled as an outcome of rational behavior of forward looking indi-
viduals with stable preferences.2 These two theories primarily diﬀer in their assumptions
regarding the length of the planning horizon which is attributed to individuals. The myopic
model assumes that the planning horizon is short and consists – in the limiting case – of
only one time period. Individuals care about today, but ignore tomorrow and hence do
not internalize the negative eﬀects of smoking and drinking on health in the future. In
contrast, rational addiction theory relies on the notion that individuals are forward looking.
Thus, individuals take into consideration the future risks associated with smoking or heavy
drinking.
Most prior empirical studies of the rational addiction theory follow Becker and Murphy
(1988) and analyze ﬁrst order conditions that prices and quantities need to satisfy, given
individuals’ (quadratic) utility functions.3 Chaloupka (1991) and Becker, Grossman, and
Murphy (1991, 1994) apply this methodology and ﬁnd that tobacco consumption typically
responds to lagged, current and future price changes as predicted by rational addiction
theory.4 However, the empirical literature seems to suggest that price eﬀects are likely to
be less important for older individuals, that are the focus of this study, than for teenagers
1One of most fascinating early analyses of alcohol abuse is due to Lowry (1947), which was published in
its original version with a 17 year delay in the Prairie Schooner, XXXVII, 4, Winter 1963/64.
2An alternative to both approaches are models based on recent work by Laibson (1997), Harris and
Laibson (2001) using hyperbolic discounting. In these models, individuals are forward looking, but put less
weight on future events than in standard forward looking models which can give rise to time inconsistent
consumption paths. See also Gruber and Koszegi (2001).
3Exceptions are recent work by Gilleskie and Strumpf (2004) who use linear approximation of decision
rules in a discrete choice model and Choo (2000) and Khwaja (2001) who estimate models using full-solution
dynamic programming techniques.
4Chaloupka and Warner (2000) provide an overview of the existing empirical literature of the rational
addiction model.
1and young adults.5 Our test of the rational addition model is, therefore, not based on the
response of individuals to current and future prices.
This study diﬀers from previous empirical studies in a number of important ways. Pre-
vious research has largely focused on young adults who are subject to experimentation,
habit formation, and reinforcement (Orphanides and Zervos, 1995). However, an important
characteristic of tobacco consumption, in particular consumption of cigarettes, is the long
latency period between time of initiation and onset of adverse events.6 Relatively few ad-
verse health events occur in the ﬁrst half of life. To illustrate, at age 35, the cumulative
probability of survival is the same for males who have never smoked and smokers. At age
45 (65, 85), the corresponding ratio is 1.02 (1.18, 2.11) (Hodgson, 1992). Perfectly for-
ward looking individuals may therefore engage in heavy consumption of harmful substances
at young ages because events in the distant future are heavily discounted. It is therefore
diﬃcult to distinguish between the two theories using data of young adults.
We focus our analysis on a sample of men in late middle age from the Health and
Retirement Study (HRS). Persons over the age of 50 start to experience negative health
shocks which are, at least partially, due to smoking and heavy drinking in the past. Much
of the uncertainty about future health and the link between smoking or drinking and health
outcomes is resolved during later years in life. We can thus study whether individuals
rationally update their consumption behavior as they experience negative health shocks
and provide a new test of the rational addiction hypothesis.7 The responses of individuals
to negative health shocks, therefore, provides the main sources of variation in the data that
we exploit in the empirical analysis.
Earlier studies have typically assumed that individuals are either myopic or forward
looking. In contrast, we adopt a dynamic discrete choice framework that allows us to control
5See, for example, the discussion in Sloan, Smith, and Taylor (2003).
6The latency period for alcohol can be substantially less than for smoking, for example, due to accidents
while being intoxicated.
7Previous tests of the rational addiction model have been based on Euler equations, which rest on the
implicit assumption that individuals must consume strictly positive amounts of alcohol or cigarettes. This
is problematic if a large number of individuals do not consume tobacco or alcohol in each time period.
2for varying degrees of forward looking behavior of individuals.8 The myopic model is a
special case of forward looking models. Our framework thus nests the competing behavioral
theories. Instead of assuming that individuals are rational, we compare a sequence of nested
models which diﬀer by their degree of forward looking behavior.9
The HRS is a sample of older individuals. Due to habit formation and the diﬃculty to
quit, it is desirable to estimate econometric models which condition on previous smoking
and drinking histories. Based on measured variables in the HRS, we can constructed vari-
ables that partially capture these diﬀerence in initial conditions. However, any observed
measures of past smoking or drinking are unlikely to capture all heterogeneity within the
panel. We therefore assume individuals diﬀer by (partially) unobserved characteristics at
the start of the panel using a semi-nonparametric approach which allows for a ﬁnite mix-
ture of types, each comprising a ﬁxed proportion of the population.10 The type probabilities
depend on time invariant state variables such as observed measures of past smoking and
drinking histories. We assume that the remaining time varying state variables are exoge-
nous conditional on type when analyzing the decisions observed in the HRS. We estimate
models with up to four diﬀerent (partially) unobserved types and report the results in the
paper
Our empirical ﬁndings suggest that forward looking models with moderately high values
of the annual discount factor ﬁt the data the best. To gain additional insights in the ﬁt of
the diﬀerent model speciﬁcations, we predict the behavior for a sample of elderly individuals
from the Asset and Health Dynamics Among the Oldest Old (AHEAD) data. We ﬁnd that
the out-of-sample predictions of our preferred forward looking model clearly dominate those
of the myopic model. We thus conclude that forward looking models provide better within
8Dynamic discrete choice estimation was ﬁrst used by Wolpin (1984), Miller (1984), Pakes (1986) and
Rust (1987). Recent applications include Hotz and Miller (1993), Keane and Wolpin (1994, 1997), Rust
and Phelan (1997), Gilleskie (1998), Eckstein and Wolpin (1999), Brien, Lillard, and Stern (2000), and
Aguirregabiria and Mira (2002).
9In that sense our paper is similar in spirit to the analysis by Fang and Silverman (2004) who analyze
whether welfare recipients adopt time-inconsistent or type consistent forward looking plans.
10This approach was introduced into the econometric literature by Heckman and Singer (1984). Keane
and Wolpin (1997) adapted these techniques in a dynamic discrete choice framework. Arcidiacono and Jones
(2003) discuss how to implement these estimators using an EM algorithm.
3sample ﬁts and out-of-sample predictions than their myopic counterparts.
Comparing myopic models to forward looking models yields substantial diﬀerences in the
consumption patterns of alcohol and tobacco over time. Larger discount factors imply larger
declines in consumption with age. In forward looking models, individuals take into account
that the marginal adverse health eﬀects of heavy drinking and smoking are higher later in
life. The main drawback of the myopic model is that it predicts rates of smoking and heavy
drinking for old individuals which are signiﬁcantly larger than those found in the AHEAD.
Myopic and forward looking models also have very diﬀerent behavioral interpretations.
Estimates of the myopic model make alcohol and tobacco appear unattractive, particularly
for the unhealthy. However, in forward looking models, alcohol and tobacco are more
attractive, but are not consumed because of losses in future utility caused by adverse health
eﬀects. This is particularly true for the unhealthy as the marginal adverse health eﬀects of
heavy drinking and smoking increase as the health of the individual deteriorates.
The rest of the study is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the data used in
this study which is based on the Health and Retirement Study. In Section 3, we develop
a sequence of forward looking models of decision making under uncertainty and discuss
identiﬁcation and estimation of these models. Section 4 reports the estimation results. In
Section 5, we analyze the ﬁt of the models using within sample and out-of-sample predic-
tions. Section 6 discusses how individuals would react to technological changes in health
care. Section 7 oﬀers some concluding remarks.
2 Data
The data used in this study come from the Health and Retirement Study. The HRS is
a national panel study of birth cohorts 1931 through 1941 and their spouses, if married.
Participants in the HRS have been interviewed every two years since 1992. We use the
ﬁrst four waves of the survey that have been completed and released. Individuals in the
ﬁrst wave of the HRS range from 51 to 61 years of age with some spouses being younger or
4older than this. The average age in wave 1 of individuals in our sample is 58.2. We analyze
smoking and heavy drinking behavior of males.
We exclude women for two reasons. First, women diﬀer signiﬁcantly from males in
preferences for alcohol and tobacco, in their attitudes towards risk, and their willingness
to engage in harmful consumption. Furthermore, women live longer and have diﬀerent
tolerance levels for alcohol and tobacco than males. Hence, transitions for health status and
mortality diﬀer signiﬁcantly between males and females. Controlling for these diﬀerences
using additive dummy variables is likely to be insuﬃcient. Second, the computational
complexity of the analysis would be a lot more challenging if we also included women since
the relevant state space for solving the dynamic model would be much larger.11
We use the panel structure of the data and include only persons who were not lost due
to attrition and had complete information for the most relevant variables of this study. Our
initial sample consists of 5,735 males. 1,281 men are lost due to attrition.
Drinking behavior questions in the HRS allow us to categorize wave 1 respondents as
current drinkers or non-drinkers, and for drinkers the average number of drinks per day.
Subsequent waves allow for tracking drinking status across time. For purposes of this study,
we categorize individuals as drinkers and non-drinkers, and, among drinkers, by drinks per
day: less than 1, 1-2, 3-4, and more than 4. We deﬁne heavy drinking as consuming three
or more drinks on average per day.12
The group of non-heavy drinkers thus largely consists of individuals who are best char-
acterized as moderate drinkers, i.e. individuals who consumer two or less drinks of alcohol
per week. Thus we are primarily analyzing behavior of moderate and heavy drinkers. A
number of individuals in the HRS consume zero drinks in all four waves. These individu-
als abstain from alcohol consumption for a variety of reasons such as religious objections,
medical necessity (i.e. adverse side eﬀects of medications), or lack of taste. Since the HRS
does not contain detailed information about the causes of abstinence, we exclude these in-
11More research is clearly needed to address the issue of how spouses inﬂuence each others smoking,
drinking, and health maintenance decisions.
12See Graham (1985) for a discussion of alternative measures of alcohol consumption.
5dividuals from the sample. This, and missing values, gives us 2,784 males on average in
each wave, a total number of 8,352 male person-waves.
Table 1: Sample Means
Wave 1 Wave 2 Wave 3 Wave 4
= 0 .157 .226 .260 .306
< 1 .558 .505 .505 .469
Number of drinks: 1 − 2 .178 .178 .166 .158
3 − 4 .080 .065 .050 .046
> 4 .027 .026 .019 .020
Smoking: yes - no .281 .256 .230 .203
excellent .238 .200 .187 .128
very good .311 .311 .339 .308
Health status: good .287 .292 .290 .326
fair .114 .141 . 135 .172
poor .050 .056 .048 .066
Total household income 65,593 58,917 56,232 52,997
Table 1 shows that there is a steady decline in alcohol consumption, smoking, health
status, and total income13 during the four waves of the panel. For example, the percentage
of individuals who do not drink increases from 15.7 percent to 30.6 percent during the
observation period. Heavy drinking declines from 10.7 percent in wave 1 to 6.6 percent
in wave 4.14 Smoking, meanwhile, declines from 28.1 percent to 20.3 percent. Some of
the trends in Table 1 are explained by the aging of the individuals in our sample. Older
individuals are more likely to be in worse health and have lower income levels than younger
13The HRS includes detailed information on both labor and non-labor income. In this paper, we deﬁne
total household income as a sum of the respondent’s wage income, the spouse’s wage income, household
capital income and other household income. Income is measured in constant 1999 dollars.
14There is an issue of whether alcoholics give valid self-reports regarding their alcohol consumption. While
there is some evidence in the literature that alcohol consumption is measured with error, there do not seem
to be any systematic trends of over- or underreporting. See, for example, Watson, Tilleskjor, Hoodecheck-
Schow, Purcel, and Jacobs (1984).
6individuals. As a consequence, these individuals are more likely to reduce their alcohol
and cigarette consumption as they get older. The response of individuals in our sample to
negative health shocks provides one of the main sources of variation in the data that we
exploit in this analysis.
Table 2: Heavy Drinking and Smoking Transitions
Lagged Consumption
d=0,s=0 d=0,s=1 d=1,s=0 d=1,s=1
d=0,s=0 5535 294 204 21
94.9% 16.6% 47.6% 6.6%
d=0,s=1 137 1384 6 133
2.3% 78.0% 1.4% 42.0%
Current d=1,s=0 151 8 211 17
Consumption 2.6% 0.5% 49.2% 5.4%
d=1,s=1 9 88 8 146
0.2% 5.0% 1.9% 46.1%
Total 5832 1774 429 317
Additional information about alcohol and tobacco consumption is given in Table 2 which
reports the transitions between heavy drinking (no, d = 0 and yes, d = 1) and smoking
(no, s = 0 and yes, s = 1) combinations. We ﬁnd that the elements on the diagonal of
the transition matrix are larger in magnitude than the elements on the oﬀ-diagonals, with
the elements on the diagonal ranging from 54 and 91 percent. Thus, in spite of the general
trend of reducing alcohol and tobacco consumption evident in the sample means, many men
have relatively stable drinking and smoking patterns which is likely due to habit formation.
However, there is still a fair amount of transitions between the diﬀerent heavy drinking and
smoking states, as reﬂected by the oﬀ-diagonal elements of the matrix.
The HRS also contains some qualitative information about past problem drinking and
smoking behavior. This information is used in the empirical analysis to control for past
7habit formation. The ﬁrst questionnaire of the HRS includes the CAGE instrument for
clinical assessment of alcohol disorders. The acronym CAGE represents four questions that
comprise the instrument: Have you ever felt you should Cut down on your drinking (32.7
percent)? Have people Annoyed you by criticizing your drinking (16.9 percent)? Have you
ever felt bad or Guilty about drinking (21.1 percent)? Have you ever had a drink ﬁrst thing
in the morning (Eye-opener) to calm your nerves or to get over a hang-over (8.7 percent)?
Item responses on the CAGE are scored 0 or 1, with a high score indicating the presence of
an alcohol problem. We deﬁne “problem drinkers” as those persons with a score of 2 or more
on the CAGE scale. This is a conservative measure since most of the diﬀerence is between
0 and 1. Edwards, Marshall, and Cook (1997) conclude that “these tests (describes another
test–MAST as well as CAGE) generally tend to pick up the more extreme rather than the
early cases ... they show remarkably good sensitivity and speciﬁcity (refers to type 1 and
type 2 errors in the language of doctors) for ’excessive drinking’ as well as ’alcoholism’ and
may be superior to laboratory tests when used as screening instruments” (p. 197). 23.6
percent of the males in our sample are classiﬁed as problem drinkers.15
With regard to past smoking behavior, the HRS asks when former smokers quit. To
capture past smoking behavior, we construct a time invariant dummy variable which equals
one if the individual quit less than 10 years ago or smoked at wave 1 and is zero otherwise.
34.5 percent of the individuals in the sample are classiﬁed as “problem smokers,” people
who entered the survey with smoking in their recent history.
High levels of alcohol use and smoking are highly correlated in our data and in other
samples.16 Thus, many of the same men who were at risk of poor health because of their
alcohol consumption patterns were also at high risk because of their smoking. Although use
of each substance carries its own risk when used independently of each other, some joint
eﬀects are appreciable.
15The CAGE testing procedure is also discussed in King (1986) and Bernadt, Taylor, Smith, and Murray
(1982).
16See, for example, Rosengren, Wilhelmsen, and Wedel (1988), Schlecht, Franco, J. Pintos, and et. al.
(1999) and Palfai, Ostaﬁn, Monti, and Hutchinson (2000).
8Self-reported health status is measured on a 5-point Likert scale ranging from excellent
(1) to poor (5). Table 1 shows the sample means for each of the ﬁve categories as they
evolve over time. Self-reported health status declines throughout most of the observational
period. However, the sample means do not decline monotonically as one may have expected,
especially for adjacent response categories, which may be due to measurement error in the
variable. We therefore aggregate the information in self-reported health status to a simple
bivariate health indicator which is equal to one if the individual is in good health (self-
reported health status less than 4) and zero otherwise.17
We also control for a number of demographic characteristics. Educational attainment
is measured by an indicator variable equal to one if the individual has a college education
and is zero otherwise. 25.9 percent of men in our sample have a college degree. We also
create a variable for the person’s expected longevity. We experimented with diﬀerent family
background variables and chose an indicator based on the life span of the mother. 23.8
percent of the sample report that their mothers died by age 70.18
We supplement the HRS data with price information for cigarettes, liquor, beer and
wine collected by American Chamber of Commerce Researchers’ Association (ACCRA) for
a large number diﬀerent localities. A price index for alcohol is constructed by weighting the
prices for liquor, beer and wine using the expenditure shares in the Consumer Price Index.
We assign alcohol and cigarette prices to individuals in the HRS sample using prices of the
nearest locality for which we have ACCRA data.19
17For a discussion of self-reported versus objective measures of health see Bound (1991).
18Admittedly it would be helpful to know the causes that led to the mother’s death. In that case one
could construct more informative variables which would distinguish between accidental sources of death,
choice related sources of early death, and diﬀerences in death due to genetic diﬀerences. Unfortunately the
HRS does include suﬃciently speciﬁc information.
19For computational reasons, we need to discretized prices for alcohol and tobacco. We split the sample
into 16 subsamples and use the mean prices in the subsamples as points in the grid.
93 The Framework
Previous analysis of the rational addiction hypothesis has been typically based on versions
of the Becker-Murphy (1988) model which rests on the assumption that individuals make
continuous choices. We are mostly interested in non-marginal changes in smoking and heavy
drinking which are caused by changes in income and health status. We therefore adapt an
alternative modelling framework based on the dynamic discrete choice literature.
3.1 A Model of Forward Looking Behavior
Consider the following model of individual decision making. Let J denote the number of
alternatives in the choice set (Ct) available to an individual in a given period. In our model,
individuals choose whether or not to smoke and whether or not to engage in heavy drinking
or not, J = 4.20 Hence there are four mutually exclusive elements in the choice set at each
point of time. Let cjt ∈ {0,1} denote an indicator variable which equals one if the individual
chooses alternative j at time t and is zero otherwise. Let the vector ct = (c1t,...,cJt)
characterize choices of an individual at t. Since the alternatives are mutually exclusive,
J X
j=1
cjt = 1 (1)
Besides the choice variables, ct, there is a vector of state variables, Xt. State variables can be
decomposed into an unobserved component, t, and an observed component, xt. Individuals
have beliefs about uncertain future states of the world. These beliefs are captured by a
Markov transition density of the state variables qt(Xt+1|Xt,ct), which satisﬁes the following
assumption:
qt(Xt+1|Xt,ct) = gt(t+1 |t,ct) ft(xt+1 |xt,ct) (2)
20As noted in the previous section, heavy drinking and smoking are strongly correlated. Failing to control
for either heavy alcohol use or smoking is likely to bias the ﬁndings, both regarding the eﬀects of alcohol
and tobacco consumption on health, earnings and other outcomes.
10In our model, individuals face two types of uncertainty: uncertainty over future health and
over future income. First, and most importantly, an individual does not know how his health
status will evolve over time. In particular, the relationship between smoking and drinking
habits and mortality and morbidity status is stochastic. An individual who engages in heavy
drinking and smoking does not necessarily experience bad health outcomes, but rather has
a higher probability of experiencing negative health shocks in the future. As individuals
experience negative health shocks they will update their believes about the remaining life
expectancy and may change the behavior. Thus our model diﬀers signiﬁcantly from the
previous literature that has tried to identify forward looking behavior based on the response
of individuals to price changes. Here we are mostly interested in the response of individuals
to changes in health status.
More formally, individuals face uncertainty about the evolution of their health status, ht.
We assume that that health status can take on three diﬀerent values, good, bad and dead.
Thus uncertainty about health status also includes uncertainty about death. We assume
that the transition probabilities for being in bad health (bht+1) and mortality status follow
a multinomial logit model:21
Pr(deatht+1) =
exp(xhtθd)




1 + exp(xhtθd) + exp(xhtθb)
where xht includes health status at time t, age, and the smoking and drinking choices at
time t. Note that consistent estimates of the θd’s and the θb’s relies upon no unobserved
variables that may aﬀect health status and are correlated with the elements of xht. We
relax this assumption in the next section when we discuss initial conditions and unobserved
heterogeneity.
We assume that individuals also face income uncertainty. They must, therefore, forecast
21We experimented with ordered logit models of health status which assume that there is one underlying
health variable with cut points at bad health and death. This model was too restrictive and did not allow
enough individuals to move from good health to death. We also experimented with nested logit models of
health status and could not reject the simpler multinomial logit model.
11the evolution of income. The transitions for future income are implicitly given by a log-
normal regression of income at time t + 1 on income, health status, age, and smoking and
drinking choices at time t.22 We index the parameters estimated here as θy.
We assume that individuals have preferences which can be represented by a time sep-
arable (expected) utility function with discount factor β. Let ut(ct,Xt) denote the single





cjt[uj(xt) + jt] (4)
We use the following speciﬁcation for part of the utility function which depends on observed
state variables:23
uj(xt) = α0j + α1j ln(yt − e(ajt,cjt)) + α2j bht + α3 1{quit drinking}
+ α4 1{quit smoking} (5)
where yt and ht refer to income and health at time t and e(djt,sjt) refer to expenditures
on drinking and smoking given choice j. 1{·} denotes an indicator function which is equal
to one if the event inside the brackets happens and is zero otherwise. This speciﬁcation
implies that each choice has a ﬁxed beneﬁt (α0j). The utility derived from income, α1j,
and health, α2j, varies across choices. Utility depends on net income. Unfortunately, the
HRS does not contain data on expenditures on alcohol and tobacco; we therefore impute
expenditures using the following expression e(djt,sjt) = min{djtpd
t + sjtps
t,φyt}.24 Using
the minimum of mean expenditures and a fraction of income, φyt, guarantees that imputed
expenditures on alcohol and tobacco are not excessively high for low income people who are
22To simplify the analysis, we assume that prices evolve deterministically and that individuals have correct
point expectations about current and future prices. For a time series analysis of tobacco prices and an
investigation of decision making in the presence of price uncertainty, see Coppejans, Gilleskie, Sieg, and
Strumpf (2004).
23For a discussion of utility functions that depend on health status, see Viscusi and Evans (1990).
24djt (sjt) are the mean quantity of alcohol (tobacco) consumption in the sample for individuals who
consume alcohol given choice j. It is zero if choice j is abstaining.
12likely to consume cheaper products than the average individual in our sample.
The last two parameters, α3 and α4, are designed to capture habit persistence of smoking
and heavy drinking. We expect that α3 (α4) is negative indicating that quitting heavy
drinking (smoking) is costly to individuals because of withdrawal eﬀects. Since it is hard
to assign quitting costs to the choices, we prefer to think of these parameters of the utility
function as measures of habit persistence and estimate them as part of the parameters of
the utility function.25
Individuals are rational and forward looking and behave according to an optimal decision








  X0 = X
)
(6)
where Eδ denotes the expectation with respect to the controlled stochastic process {Xt,ct}
induced by the decision rule, δ. This notation is thus consistent with the key feature of the
model that individuals do not have perfect foresight and face uncertainty about the impacts
of smoking and heavy drinking on health outcomes and mortality.
3.2 Estimation
The parameters of our model consist of the parameters of the utility function and the tran-
sition probabilities. Since a Markov decision process yields deterministic decision rules, we
need to rely on unobserved state variables to generate a properly deﬁned econometric model.
Rust (1987) shows that if the unobserved state variables satisfy the assumptions of additive
separability (AS) and conditional independence (CI), conditional choice probabilities are
well deﬁned. If we additionally assume that the unobservables in preferences follow a Type
25Since discrete choices only depend on relative utility levels, we can normalize a set of coeﬃcients. We
set α11 = 1 and αi1 = 0 for i 6= 1.
13I extreme value distribution, we obtain Rust’s multinomial dynamic logit speciﬁcation:





where the conditional value function vjt(x,θ) is recursively deﬁned as:
vjT(xT,α,β,θ) = ujT(xT,α) (8)













Substituting these value functions into equation (7) yields the conditional choice probabili-
ties of the dynamic logit model. We observe a panel of N individuals over T periods. The






Lcnt(α,β,θ) + Lhnt(θd,θb) + Lynt(θy) (9)
where Lcnt is the log-likelihood of the individual n’s choices on smoking and heavy drinking
at time t, with Lhnt and Lynt the corresponding contributions of the health and income
transitions. Note that since the log likelihood is additively separable, it is possible to
estimate the model in steps.26 In particular, we could estimate the θ’s using only the
second two terms of the log likelihood above. Taking these values of the θ’s as given, we
could then use the ﬁrst term in the log likelihood only to estimate the α’s and β.
3.3 Initial Conditions and Unobserved Heterogeneity
The above likelihood function assumes there are no persistent unobserved variables in the
health and income transitions and no unobserved persistent tastes for drinking and smoking.
An individual with bad health endowments and strong tastes for smoking and drinking is
much more likely to be classiﬁed as problem drinker or problem smoker at the beginning
of the sample period. Similarly, a highly educated person may be more strongly aware of
26See Rust and Phelan (1997) for an example of sequential estimation of dynamic discrete choice problems.
14the negative health eﬀects of smoking and drinking or may discount the future less. As a
consequence he would be less likely to enter the panel with a strong smoking or drinking
history. These examples illustrate that it is problematic to ignore unobserved heterogeneity,
especially if it is correlated with initial conditions that characterize previous pattern of habit
formation in the sample. Ignoring these problems is likely to cause inconsistent estimators
of the parameters of the model.
We therefore assume individuals diﬀer by unobserved characteristics at the start of the
panel. Following Heckman and Singer (1984) and Keane and Wolpin (1997), we account
for unobserved state variables using a semi-nonparametric approach which allows for a
ﬁnite mixture of types, each comprising a ﬁxed proportion of the population. These type
probabilities depend on all time invariant state variables observed in the beginning of the
panel including observed measures of past smoking and drinking histories. More formally,
we assume that there are M discrete types of individuals. The probability that an individual





m = 1,...M (10)
In our application, zn contains the problem drinker and problem smoker variables, as well as
age at wave 1 interacted with lagged smoking and drink choices. It also includes education
and a measure of the mother’s longevity, whether one’s mother died by the age of 70.
An individual’s type aﬀects both the health and income transitions as well as his tastes
for drinking and smoking. For income, we assume that the intercept term in the log income
regression varies across type. For health, we could allow type to have an independent eﬀect
on death and bad health. However, since once an individual dies we observe no future
health transitions, we instead assume that each additional type adds only one parameter to
the health transitions. Namely, we restrict the eﬀect of type on the death and bad health
probabilities to be proportional to the corresponding coeﬃcients on lagged bad health. The

























where Im takes on a value of one if the individual is a member of the mth type and x1ht
refers to xht without the lagged bad health status.
We also allow the value of type to aﬀect the utility of heavy drinking and smoking
directly in two ways. First, the intercept terms for smoking and heavy drinking are allowed
to vary by type. Second, we allow the discount factor, β, to vary across type in some














where the likelihoods, l’s, are type-speciﬁc. Note that the log likelihood is no longer ad-
ditively separable and hence a two-step estimator is not feasible. Estimation can still be
accomplished by maximizing the objective function with respect to all parameters at once.
However, this approach is computationally intensive. We pursue, therefore, in this paper an
iterative estimator proposed by Arcidiacono and Jones (2003). This estimator is consistent
and signiﬁcantly decreases the required estimation time.27
Arcidiacono and Jones (2003) note that one of the techniques for solving mixture models,
the Expectation-Maximization (EM) Algorithm, reintroduces the additive separability of
the log likelihood function at the maximization step. The EM algorithm works as follows.
First, given initial values of the parameters we calculate the conditional probability that an
individual is a particular type. Using these conditional probabilities as weights, we treat
type as observed and maximize the now additively separable log likelihood function. Given
27This algorithm has been used in similar situations by Arcidiacono (2004) and Arcidiacono (2005).
16the new parameter estimates, we then update the conditional probabilities of being each of
the types and iterate until convergence.
More formally, given values for the α’s, β’s, θ’s, and γ’s, the conditional probability of








t=1 lcntm(α,β,θ) lhntm(θd,θb) lyntm(θy)
(12)







Pnm (Lcntm(α,β,θ) + Lhntm(θd,θb) + Lyntm(θy)) (13)
Taking the Pnm’s as given, we can estimate the θ’s using only the last two terms. Given
values for the θ’s, we can then estimate the α’s and the β’s. With the estimates of the α’s,
β’s, and θ’s, we can estimate the γ’s by maximizing (11) with respect to the γ’s, taking
the l’s (the likelihoods) as given. Once we have the γ’s, we update the conditional type
probabilities and again proceed with the sequential maximization, iterating on these steps
until convergence.
3.4 Myopic Behavior
As discussed above, heavy drinking and smoking can also stem from myopic behavior which
implies that individuals ignore future risks of harmful consumption goods. The myopic
model is nested in the forward looking model described above. In the limiting case of the
myopic model, individuals ignore the future.28 We can obtain this version of the myopic
model by setting the discount factor β equal to zero. The choice probabilities are then given
by the simple (static) logit model:





28We condition our analysis on behavior prior to age 50. Hence, our analysis does not allow us to make
statements about behavior of younger adults who may be more likely to engage in myopic behavior.
17More generally, we can thus distinguish between myopic and forward looking models based
on the value of β. Low estimated values of β suggest myopia; large values of the two-period
discount factor β in the magnitude of 0.9 are an indication of “fully rational” behavior.29
3.5 Identiﬁcation of the Discount Factor and Model Selection
Before we proceed and report the main empirical ﬁndings of this paper it is useful to discuss
the main diﬀerences between myopic and forward looking behavior in our context. In a
forward looking model individuals will trade-oﬀ the short term beneﬁts of the consumption
of alcohol and smoking – measured by the per period utility function – with the long term
costs – measured by the expected future value function. These long-term costs result because
excessive smoking and alcohol consumption make it more likely that an individual will be
in bad health. Smoking and heavy drinking also increases the mortality risks and hence
lowers life expectancies. The costs largely depend on the evolution of the health status
which is stochastic. Thus in a forward looking model smoking and heavy drinking may be
quite attractive activities. They may yield a higher instantaneous utility than abstaining.
However, individuals will primarily stay away from these activities because they recognize
that the greater health risks signiﬁcantly lower the expected future value associated with
these activities.
In contrast, myopic individuals will largely abstain from smoking and heavy drinking
because these options are unattractive to them. They result in low values of the instan-
taneous utility function. As a consequence, if we ﬁt forward looking and myopic models
to the same data, we expect to obtain quite diﬀerent parameter estimates. To explain the
same observed pattern in the sample, myopic and forward looking models will have to be
based on diﬀerent parameter estimates. The discount factor is thus primarily identiﬁed in
our paper from the observed smoking-age and heavy drinking-age proﬁles in the data. By
29The utility function in the simple logit model can also be interpreted as a linear approximation of the
conditional value function. Following that line of reasoning, we are then comparing dynamic models based
on full solution algorithms with those based on linear approximations of value functions. It is hard to
distinguish between the two alternative interpretations of the simple logit model.
18excluding age as an explanatory variable in the instantaneous utility function, we let the
data determine the level of forward looking behavior which largely determines the relative
values of each option in the choice set. There is thus a close link the smoking-age and
drinking age-proﬁles and the rate of time preference if one does not place age directly into
the utility function.
The discussion also implies that myopic and forward looking models, evaluated at their
parameter estimates, will have diﬀerent out-of-sample predictions. We can also evaluate
the validity of each behavioral hypothesis by conducting a horse race and analyzing which
model has better out-of-sample predictive properties.
4 Estimation Results
We estimated a variety of models with diﬀerent number of types. Here we only report the
estimates of models with four types.30 Tables 3 through 6 summarize the main ﬁndings for
four diﬀerent model speciﬁcations. The ﬁrst model is a myopic model that is obtained by
setting the discount factor equal to 0.0. The fully rational model uses a two-period discount
rate of 0.9. We also estimate an unconstrained dynamic model by searching over a grid
for β. The last model that we consider also allows for heterogeneity in discount factors
among the four types of individuals. Tables 3 and 4 report the results for the transition
probabilities. Table 5 summarizes the parameter estimates for the utility function. Finally,
Table 6 reports the estimates for the type probabilities.
The behavior predicted by the forward looking model depends on beliefs that individuals
hold about the evolution of the main state variables. In our model, individuals have beliefs
about transitions of their health status, mortality, and income. Estimating these transitions
is important because smoking and heavy drinking are likely to reduce the life span of an
individual, and thus reduce expected lifetime utility. Out-of-sample predictions of survival
rates are needed to solve the computational dynamic programming model.
30Results for one and two type models are available upon request from the authors.
19Table 3: Parameter Estimates of the Health Transitions
β=0 β=0.9 Estimated β Heterogeneous β
Coeﬀ Std. Err Coeﬀ Std. Err Coeﬀ Std. Err Coeﬀ Std. Err
Bad Health
Constant -2.867 0.0997 -2.8429 0.0991 -2.8526 0.0994 -2.8541 0.0995
Lagged Bad Health 2.7923 0.0709 2.7928 0.0709 2.793 0.0709 2.7926 0.0709
Age 0.0871 0.0129 0.0862 0.0129 0.0865 0.0129 0.0864 0.0129
Lagged Drinking -0.0241 0.1333 -0.0171 0.1322 -0.0187 0.1328 -0.0183 0.1326
Lagged Smoking 0.1432 0.0809 0.1347 0.0815 0.1395 0.0812 0.1386 0.0812
Death
Constant -6.3415 0.2426 -6.3167 0.242 -6.3264 0.2423 -6.3274 0.2423
Lagged Bad Health 2.8554 0.1477 2.8555 0.1479 2.8556 0.1478 2.8546 0.1478
Age 0.2562 0.0269 0.2554 0.0269 0.2556 0.0269 0.2555 0.0269
Lagged Drinking -0.0691 0.2545 -0.0613 0.2538 -0.0632 0.2542 -0.0628 0.2540
Lagged Smoking 0.7357 0.1609 0.7258 0.1613 0.7311 0.1611 0.7302 0.1611
Type=2 0.1482 0.0453 0.1402 0.0447 0.1431 0.0451 0.1438 0.0449
Type=3 0.2478 0.0310 0.2419 0.0310 0.2439 0.0310 0.2448 0.0310
Type=4 -0.2193 0.0426 -0.2303 0.0427 -0.2233 0.0425 -0.2247 0.0427
2
0Accurate estimation of these transitions is therefore an important component of the overall
modelling strategy. We assume that individuals subjective beliefs correspond to probability
measures that can be estimated based on observed data.31
Table 3 reports the results for the health and death transitions. Individuals who are in
bad health are much more likely to face bad health outcomes in the future. Similarly, as
individuals age they are more likely to experience bad health outcomes or die. The same
holds true for smoking as smoking today makes bad health more likely in the future, with
even stronger eﬀects on the probability of dying. Since there is a large negative intercept
term for death, signiﬁcant death probabilities only result when an individual is very old or in
bad health. Hence, the marginal eﬀect of smoking on the probability of dying is much higher
at seventy than at ﬁfty. This will then lead to a downward sloping age-smoking proﬁle, at
least at ages below ninety. The type eﬀects indicate that type 1 and 4 have better health
transitions than types 2 and 3. As we will see in the discussion of type probabilities, type
4 individuals tend to be those who graduate from college while type 1’s ﬁnd smoking and
heavy drinking unattractive in general. The parameter estimates are robust across the four
model speciﬁcations.
The one puzzling result is the lack of an eﬀect of heavy drinking on either bad health or
death. Previous medical studies have documented the potential negative health eﬀects of
heavy drinking among the elderly. Equal doses of alcohol produce higher blood alcohol levels
among the elderly compared to the young. Heavy alcohol use increase the risks of injuries
and illnesses, including falls, depression, and cognitive impairment, and mortality (Andreas-
son, 1998). The elderly are also more susceptible to the ill eﬀects of alcoholism because
of medication and drug-alcohol interactions (Adams, Gary, Rhyne, Hunt, and Goodwin,
1990). We do not see these eﬀects here even though these would be consistent with the
downward sloping age-drinking proﬁles in the data. However, the standard errors are large
and economically signiﬁcant eﬀects can be found within the ninety-ﬁve percent conﬁdence
intervals of the estimates .
31Sloan, Smith, and Taylor (2001) provide some evidence that individuals correctly update their beliefs in
response to health shocks.
21Table 4: Parameter Estimates of the Income Function
β=0 β=0.9 Estimated β Heterogeneous β
Coeﬀ Std. Err Coeﬀ Std. Err Coeﬀ Std. Err Coeﬀ Std. Err
Constant 5.4447 0.1185 5.4487 0.1185 5.4459 0.1185 5.4476 0.1185
Lagged Income 0.5026 0.0104 0.5021 0.0104 0.5024 0.0104 0.5023 0.0104
Lagged Bad Health -0.2432 0.0247 -0.243 0.0246 -0.2432 0.0246 -0.243 0.0246
Age -0.0587 0.0037 -0.0586 0.0037 -0.0586 0.0037 -0.0586 0.0037
Lagged Drinking -0.0677 0.0396 -0.0623 0.0393 -0.0643 0.0395 -0.0631 0.0394
Lagged Smoking -0.0476 0.024 -0.044 0.0242 -0.0457 0.0241 -0.0452 0.0240
Type=2 0.0789 0.0371 0.0717 0.0367 0.0749 0.037 0.0727 0.0369
Type=3 -0.0213 0.0247 -0.0214 0.0249 -0.0208 0.0248 -0.0214 0.0248
Type=4 0.3332 0.0264 0.3368 0.0264 0.3334 0.0263 0.3349 0.0264
2
2Estimating beliefs that individuals hold about income transitions is also complex. Cur-
rent income of individuals obviously is largely aﬀected by current and past labor market
participation, retirement and saving decisions. Modelling these decisions within a well-
deﬁned dynamic programming model is exceedingly complicated as documented, for exam-
ple, by Rust and Phelan (1997). We do not seek to improve upon these eﬀorts. Instead,
we analyze interactions between consumption of various harmful goods and their health
eﬀects. We therefore adapt a reduced form approach for modelling the income process. The
main approach for modelling income transitions is based on log-normal income regressions.
Estimates of the transition parameters of the income equation are given in Table 4.
In general, our ﬁndings are quite reasonable. The parameters have the expected sign in
almost all cases and are often estimated precisely. Not surprisingly, income follows a strong
autoregressive process.32 Health status and age are signiﬁcant in all three models and have
the expected negative sign. Heavy drinking and smoking negatively aﬀect future income.
Types 2 and 4 have higher labor market skills than types 1 and 3, with particularly high
incomes for Type 4’s who are primarily college graduates.
We estimate the preference parameters of the utility function speciﬁed in equation (5)
using myopic and forward looking model speciﬁcations. Most of the coeﬃcients in the
utility functions have the expected sign and are statistically signiﬁcant. Our results suggest
that, on average, lower income individuals are more likely to engage in smoking and heavy
drinking.33
32Income is measured as total household income and therefore one would expect a lower coeﬃcient than
estimates typically found for labor income.
33The maximum fraction of income that an individual can spend on alcohol and tobacco is set at 15%.
23Table 5: Parameter Estimates of the Utility Function
β=0 β=0.9 Estimated β Heterogeneous β
Coeﬀ Std. Err Coeﬀ Std. Err Coeﬀ Std. Err Coeﬀ Std. Err
Two-year β 0 0.9 0.8192 0.05152 0.9933 0.0292
Type 2 Two-year β 0.6851 0.1456
Type 3 Two-year β 0.7354 0.0838
Type 4 Two-year β 0.8208 0.0681
Constant -13.6817 5.8207 -4.7333 0.987 -4.7101 1.0242 -3.5658 1.2025
d=1,s=1 Ln Income 0.7563 0.0824 0.807 0.0684 0.8034 0.0698 0.7934 0.0715
Bad Health -0.2907 0.1954 0.2121 0.1745 0.0557 0.1942 0.0092 0.1913
Constant -2.6736 0.6527 -1.2057 0.5793 -1.2795 0.5913 -1.0814 0.6004
d=1,s=0 Ln Income 0.8062 0.0606 0.825 0.0535 0.823 0.0543 0.8233 0.0553
Bad Health -0.3677 0.1608 -0.4184 0.1384 -0.4035 0.141 -0.3991 0.1468
Constant -9.5438 5.7733 -1.899 0.8009 -1.8512 0.8157 -0.9353 1.0204
d=0,s=1 Ln Income 0.823 0.0505 0.8414 0.0375 0.8427 0.0391 0.8351 0.0401
Bad Health -0.3011 0.1179 0.364 0.116 0.1824 0.1533 0.1286 0.1454
Quitting Cost-Drinking -1.6785 0.1212 -1.7369 0.1197 -1.7148 0.1205 -1.7232 0.1204
Quitting Cost-Smoking -4.5368 0.1033 -4.4754 0.1028 -4.5024 0.1029 -4.5072 0.1029
Type 2-Abstain Alc -8.8634 5.7477 -3.6128 0.5626 -3.2602 0.5773 -2.0123 1.014
Type 2-Abstain Smoke -3.5922 0.2253 -2.8462 0.21 -2.8594 0.2074 -2.5073 0.2808
Type 3-Abstain Alc -8.6261 5.7473 -3.651 0.5606 -3.2662 0.5774 -2.1591 0.9681
Type 3-Abstain Smoke -1.6559 0.225 -1.4104 0.1983 -1.3525 0.1963 -1.0267 0.2513
Type 4-Abstain Alc -7.9795 5.7472 -3.3455 0.5817 -2.9373 0.5962 -2.1336 0.9501
Type 4-Abstain Smoke 0.3256 0.3902 0.4311 0.3702 0.5865 0.3856 0.7379 0.4125
Log-likelihood 17199 17195 17194 17192
2
4Including variables for habit formation improves the ﬁt of the model considerably. There
are substantial costs for quitting smoking or heavy drinking. Quitting smoking, however, is
much harder than quitting heavy drinking. The parameter estimates of the utility function
diﬀer signiﬁcantly across model speciﬁcations. The parameter estimates of the instanta-
neous utility function indicate that smoking or heavy drinking are more attractive alterna-
tives in forward looking models. This ﬁnding is due to the fact that myopic models do not
account for the fact that the future expected utility of abstaining is higher due to improved
health and longer life expectancies.
The ﬁnding that there are only small diﬀerences in the estimated quitting costs between
myopic and the forward looking models may at ﬁrst seem puzzling. One potential expla-
nation for this result is as follows. If the true data generating process involves forward
looking behavior, estimating a myopic model will still be approximating the results from a
forward looking model. We ﬁnd much lower intercept terms for drinking and smoking in
the utility function for the myopic model. When a myopic model is used, the diﬀerences in
expected future utility across the choices are largely captured by the intercepts. Hence, the
myopic model shows that individuals generally do not have a preference for drinking and
smoking. In contrast, the forward looking models indicate that individuals enjoy drinking
and smoking. But they do not engage in these activities because of the future health risks.
The lagged variables themselves pick up the same level of persistence in the drinking and
smoking decisions that are revealed in the data regardless of whether we estimate a myopic
model or a forward looking model.
The values of the likelihood functions indicate that the forward looking model (β = 0.9)
ﬁts the data slightly better than the myopic model (β = 0.0). The unconstrained estimate
of the model yields a point estimate for the two-period discount factor β of approximately
0.82, which translates into an annual discount factor of approximately 0.91.34 Based on the
likelihood values, we conclude that forward looking models provide a slightly better ﬁt than
34Discount rates both higher and lower have been reported in the literature. These studies use diﬀerent
approaches for estimating discount rates than we do. See Hausman (1979), Dreyfus and Viscusi (1995),
Moore and Viscusi (1988, 1990), and Warner and Pleeter (2001).
25myopic models.
We have argued before that controlling for unobserved heterogeneity and diﬀerences in
initial conditions is important for obtaining reliable parameter estimates. The results in
Tables 3 - 5 clearly indicate that there are substantial diﬀerences among the four types.
Moreover, we also ﬁnd that the parameter estimates for the discount factor may be seriously
biased downward if one does not account for unobserved heterogeneity. For example, the
point estimate in the one-type model for the two-year discount factor is equal to 0.59 which
is almost 25% lower than the point estimate obtained in the four type model. Finally, we
also estimated a model which allowed for heterogeneity in the discount factors among the
four types. The last two columns in Table 5 indicate that the two-year discount factors
vary from 0.685 to 0.993 which suggests individuals may have diﬀerent time preferences.
Finally, we consider the estimation results which measure the impact of observed time
invariant characteristics on the type probabilities. These results are summarized in Table
6 for all four model speciﬁcations. We ﬁnd that there are many commonalities among the
speciﬁcations. Types 2, 3, and 4 are all more likely to enter the panel with signiﬁcant
histories of smoking and heavy drinking.
Educated individuals have typically high levels of income and thus have access to better
health care. As a consequence they have longer life expectancies, and thus smoking or
heavy drinking may be less attractive for them. More educated individuals may also be
more aware of the negative health eﬀects of smoking. We explore this hypothesis and
include education in the type probabilities. We ﬁnd that education has a strong impact on
the type probabilities. Hence there is some evidence that smoking patterns among older
individuals diﬀer by educational backgrounds. The type probabilities depend to a lesser
degree on the longevity of the mother thus picking up diﬀerences in health endowments.
These diﬀerences are also reﬂected in the point estimates reported in Table 3.
In summary, we ﬁnd that forward looking models ﬁt the data slightly better than myopic
models. The models also yield diﬀerent estimates for key parameters of the model. In
particular, estimates of myopic models imply that the instantaneous utility of smoking and
26Table 6: Parameter Estimates: Type Probabilities
Model Variable Type=2 Type=3 Type=4
Constant -2.618 -1.9969 -19.9151
Problem Drink 1.0132 2.4038 1.2658
Two-Year β=0 Problem Smoke 11.0168 19.1057 10.2435
Mother Dead by 70 -1.2098 1.0836 -0.7443
College 0.9138 -25.00 21.361
Drink Wave 1 6.0235 1.3318 1.0363
Smoke Wave 1 20.1204 8.563 19.2468
Drink Wave 1×Age Wave 1 -0.3455 -2.8825 -0.2868
Smoke Wave 1×Age Wave 1 -1.2077 1.9818 -1.3763
Mean Prob. 0.1339 0.3633 0.1758
Constant -2.6269 -2.1111 -19.8829
Problem Drink 0.9877 2.3918 1.3047
Two-year β=.9 Problem Smoke 10.7948 19.5158 10.0378
Mother Dead by 70 -1.2497 1.0989 -0.7655
College 1.0251 -25.00 21.3974
Drink Wave 1 6.169 0.9259 1.2546
Smoke Wave 1 20.2845 7.9617 19.6808
Drink Wave 1×Age Wave 1 -0.3713 -2.899 -0.3134
Smoke Wave 1×Age Wave 1 e -1.1878 2.1078 -1.4888
Mean Prob. 0.1362 0.3566 0.1756
Constant -2.6669 -2.0512 -19.8732
Problem Drink 1.0565 2.4166 1.3124
Two-year β Problem Smoke 10.8846 19.3771 10.0877
Estimated Mother Dead by 70 -1.2672 1.083 -0.7546
College 1.0773 -25.00 21.4057
Drink Wave 1 6.2174 1.115 1.2783
Smoke Wave 1 20.2076 8.0965 19.6299
Drink Wave 1×Age Wave 1 -0.3736 -2.8989 -0.3102
Smoke Wave 1×Age Wave 1 -1.1963 2.0689 -1.4589
Mean Prob. 0.1345 0.3603 0.177
Constant -2.6385 -2.0386 -19.8848
Problem Drink 1.0473 2.4057 1.3267
Two-year β Problem Smoke 10.8674 19.3722 10.1171
Heterogeneous Mother Dead by 70 -1.2614 1.1019 -0.7633
College 1.0514 -25.00 21.3973
Drink Wave 1 6.2029 1.114 1.2989
Smoke Wave 1 20.209 8.105 19.6232
Drink Wave 1×Age Wave 1 -0.3707 -2.8963 -0.3118
Smoke Wave 1×Age Wave 1 -1.1823 2.0729 -1.4595
Mean Prob. 0.1355 0.3612 0.1763
27heavy drinking is lower than the one in forward looking models. As a consequence, we
expect these models to have diﬀerent predictive properties. We investigate these issues in
detail in the next section.
5 Goodness of Fit and Out-of-Sample Predictions
We consider both within sample ﬁt and out-of sample predictions of the models estimated
above. Table 7 reports the predicted probabilities of smoking and heavy drinking for the
observations from waves 2-4 of the HRS and compares these predictions to the actual
data. Table 7 suggests that there are only small diﬀerences in the models’ within-sample
predictions. All of the models match the overall trend in the data reasonably well.
Table 7: Within Sample Fit
Wave 2 Wave 3 Wave 4
Myopic .085 .075 .068
Fully Rational .084 .075 .069
Proportion Drinking Estimated Beta .084 .075 .068
Hetero. Beta .084 .075 .068
Data .091 .069 .066
Myopic .253 .222 .205
Fully Rational .257 .222 .202
Proportion Smoking Estimated Beta .256 .222 .202
Hetero. Beta .256 .222 .202
Data .256 .230 .203
A more interesting comparison of the diﬀerent models examines out-of sample predic-
tions. In this study, we focus on predicted smoking proﬁles as a function of age. This allows
us to evaluate the models since we do not include age as an explanatory variable in the
preferences. We run the following experiment. We take the set of individuals in our data
28and forecast out the probabilities of smoking at each age. We condition on being alive by
dividing the unconditional probabilities of smoking by the mean probability of being alive
at a particular age. Individuals with a high probability of dying are weighted less in later
years than those who have a low probability of dying.
We plot in Figure 1 the age-smoking proﬁles for HRS data as well as data from the Asset
and Health Dynamics Among the Oldest Old (AHEAD). AHEAD is a companion data set
to HRS which contains individuals that were aged 70 or over in 1993, and their spouses who
could be any age. In particular, the HRS data are used for ages 52 to 72, and then the ﬁrst
3 waves of the AHEAD data are attached for ages 72 to 90. One caution is necessary when
examining the AHEAD data: the model was estimated with permanent abstainers removed
from the HRS; this was not possible for the AHEAD data.
Large diﬀerences across the models are apparent when examining the age-smoking pro-
ﬁles. The myopic model predicts fairly ﬂat proﬁles. As individuals age, they become more
unhealthy which makes smoking less attractive. However, they also become poorer which
makes smoking more attractive. In contrast, the fully rational model predicts sharp declines
in smoking rates. Here, individuals smoke more than in the myopic model up until the age
of 62. The decline in smoking rates occurs because the marginal adverse health eﬀects of
smoking increase as individuals age. After the age of 80 the myopic model shows decreases
in smoking rates, the fully rational model shows increases in smoking rates. This occurs
because of an end-of-life eﬀect. Individuals expect to die soon. Hence they are more likely
to ignore the negative health eﬀects of smoking and heavy drinking. The model in which the
discount factor is estimated yields proﬁles in between the fully rational and myopic model
for ages 60 through 85. After age 85, the model predicts lower smoking rates than either
of the myopic or the fully rational model. Finally, the model with heterogeneous discount
factors predicts an even steeper proﬁle. This model clearly matches the trends in the data
best, both in and out of sample.
Finally, we consider heavy drinking pattern as a function of age. The results are plotted
in Figure 2. Our ﬁndings suggest that all of our models do not match the trend in the





































Figure 1: Age-smoking proﬁles under diﬀerent discount factors









































Figure 2: Age-drinking proﬁles under diﬀerent discount factors
31AHEAD well. We ﬁnd that both the myopic and the estimated discount factor model
predict very ﬂat age-drinking proﬁles. This corresponds to the drinking pattern found in
the HRS. The fully rational model predicts declining alcohol consumption until the age 78
and increasing consumption after that. The data show sharp declines in alcohol consumption
later in the life-cycle.
There are two plausible explanations for the lack of predictive power of the alcohol-
age proﬁles of all our models. First, our estimates imply that heavy drinking has only a
small impact on health outcomes. As a consequence all of our models have a hard time
explaining why individuals quit as they get older. If we used higher parameter estimates in
the health transitions for the impact of heavy drinking, the forward-looking models would
ﬁt the trend in the data much better. Second, the lack of ﬁt may also be due to a deﬁciency
in the construction of the data. AHEAD did not have the information needed to remove
permanent abstainers. This would obviously aﬀect the proﬁles for heavy drinking more
than for smoking. It is thus likely that the observed patterns in AHEAD sample are not
good predictors for future drinking for the HRS sample used in the estimation of our model.
6 Implications of the Model
The diﬀerent models also lead to diﬀerential responses to either public policy or advances
in medical technology. Here we focus on how the age-smoking proﬁle change given advances
in medical technology. We consider a case in which smoking is less taxing on one’s health.35
In our experiment we focus on 52 year old individuals and assume that at age 65 a medical
advance occurs such that the coeﬃcients on smoking in the health transitions fall by ﬁfty
percent.
We plot the predicted age-smoking proﬁles of ﬁve models in Figure 3. The baseline
forward looking model with heterogeneous discount factors is given by the bold line. If
35We also investigated the eﬀects of price changes on smoking and heavy drinking behavior. Increasing
the price of either alcohol or cigarettes leads to increases in the demand for the other suggesting that heavy
drinking and smoking serve as substitutes.
32individuals anticipate the advance in technology, the results are given by the dotted line. If
the advance is a surprise, the results are given by the bold dashed line. The myopic baseline
model is given by the solid line. The myopic model after the change in technology is given
by the dashed line. Note that the myopic model has the same predictions regardless of
whether the medical advance is anticipated or not.
Figure 3: Age-smoking proﬁles with a medical advance




































First consider the case in which the medical advance comes as a surprise and is thus
not anticipated. Not surprisingly, Figure 3 shows that the behavior until age 65 is not
aﬀected by an unanticipated medical advance in both myopic and forward-looking models.
33However, there are pronounced behavior responses starting at age 65. The forward looking
model predicts smoking rates start to increase at age 65. This occurs because individuals
in the forward looking model like to smoke but avoid it because of the negative health con-
sequences. Relaxing the negative consequences then increases smoking rates. In contrast,
the medical advance has no direct eﬀect on the evaluation of the diﬀerent alternatives in
the myopic model. Smoking rates increase in the myopic model after the medical advance
because individuals are less likely to be in bad health. This (indirect) eﬀect is, however,
small in comparison to the changes in behavior in the forward looking model.
Figure 3 also shows that smoking rates increase in a forward-looking model before age
65 when the medical advance is anticipated. Individuals know that the expected health
costs of smoking will be smaller in the future. They anticipate the future beneﬁts of the
medical advance. As a consequence smoking is a more attractive option even before the
medical innovation occurs.
Given the large diﬀerences in behavioral responses, we also expect diﬀerences in the
predicted death rates. Figure 4 plots the percent change in the probability of dying from
moving from the base case to the case with the medical advance.36 We ﬁnd that death
rates actually increase before age 65 when the medical advance is anticipated. Individuals
forecasting the medical advance increase their smoking rates before age 65. This leads to
a higher probability of death. Death rates drop the most in the myopic model since the
myopic model induces the smallest change in smoking behavior. More individuals smoke in
forward looking models in the post-advance regime than in the myopic model.
The death rates actually increase in the forward looking models after age 75. This
occurs in part because people who would have died earlier are now living longer. However,
the increased death rates are also due to the higher smoking rates. In fact, a crossing point
occurs: the overall probability of living until age 86 is higher with the medical advance but
is lower post age 86 because of the higher smoking rates. This does not occur in the myopic
36The comparison group for the forward looking models is the model with heterogeneous discount factors
without the advance while the comparison group for the myopic model is the myopic model without the
advance.
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Figure 4: Changes in the probability of dying with a medical advance
35model because of the lack of a behavioral response to the medical advance.
7 Conclusions
This study has analyzed smoking and heavy drinking in a sample of elderly individuals
drawn from the HRS. The main objective of the analysis has been to explore diﬀerences
between myopic and forward looking models. We have investigated whether models of
forward looking behavior explain the main regularities found in the data better than myopic
models. Earlier studies have typically assumed that individuals are either myopic or forward
looking. In contrast, we provide an empirical framework which allows us to control for
varying degrees of forward looking behavior of individuals and, therefore, nest the competing
theories. Estimating the discount factor is desirable and helps us to distinguish between the
competing hypotheses which have been put forward to explain the consumption of harmful
and addictive goods. Our analysis suggests that forward looking models which control for
observed habit formation, unobserved heterogeneity and diﬀerences in initial conditions ﬁt
the data the best. They also have the best predictive power for a sample of mean above
age 70. Our analysis thus provides strong evidence for the hypothesis that older individuals
are forward looking and take future risks associated with smoking and heavy drinking into
consideration when determining their choices.
Our analysis relies on a number of simplifying assumptions. Models based on hyperbolic
discounting present an alternative to the two types of models considered here. Our frame-
work could be extended to estimate a behavioral model with hyperbolic discount factors.
Future research, with longer panels, should investigate whether these hybrid models provide
better ﬁts of the data than models we analyzed. Although estimating hyperbolic-discounting
models are feasible, in principle, additional problems arise because of the need to estimate
two separate discount factors. Given the availability of only short panels, it may prove to
be quite challenging to precisely estimate these types of models.37 Nevertheless, our results
37Fang and Silverman (2004) provide some evidence which suggests the presence of hyperbolic discounting
among welfare recipients.
36are quite promising for further work which combines formal decision-theoretic analysis and
estimation to address questions regarding the degree of forward looking behavior imposed
in modelling the consumption of potentially harmful and addictive goods.
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